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IMPRISONED FOR MEMBERSHIP:
THE JUNIUS SCALES CASE
INTRODUCTION
Sandra L. Cobden, James A. Rogers, and David Rudenstine*
On June 5, 1961, a sharply divided Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of Junius Scales for being a member of the Communist
Party.* The Court's decision came after an arduous journey through
the federal judicial system that included two district court trials, two
appeals to the United States Court of Appeals, and three Supreme
Court arguments.^
Scales was convicted under the membership clause of the Smith
Act which made it a felony to be a knowing member of any organiza
tion that advocated the forceful overthrow of the United States gov
ernment.^ As interpreted by the Court, a conviction under the
membership clause required proof of active membership in a subver
sive organization, knowledge of the organization's aim to overthrow
* Sandra L. Cobden and James A. Rogers are 1990 graduates of Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law. David Rudenstine is a Professor of Law at Cardozo. The authors wish to
thank Maria Whitman for her assistance on this Introduction.
1 Scales V. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (5-4 decision).
2 Scales was indicted in 1954 and convicted for the first time in 1955. United States v.
Scales, MDNC CR 4320-G (M.D.N.C. 1955). The Fourth Circuit sustained his conviction
later that same year. 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
scheduling the case to be heard during the 1956 Term. 350 U.S. 992 (1955). The case was
argued brfore the Cotirt on October 10-11, 1956, and then restored to the docket for reargument on June 3, 1957. 353 U.S. 979 (1957). Before the reargument could take place, however,
the United States moved to reverse, conceding that the Court's intervening decision in Jencks
V. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), entitled Scales to a new trial. The Court granted the
United States's motion and reversed Scales's conviction. 355 U.S. 1 (1957). Scales was retried
and convicted for a second time in 1958. United States v. Scales, MDNC CR 4320-G
(M.D.N.C. 1958). The Fourth Circuit again upheld his conviction. 260 F.2d 21 (4th Cir.
1958). The Court granted certiorari on December 15, 1958. 358 U.S. 917 (1958). AAer oral
arguments on April 29,1959, the case was rescheduled for reargument on November 11,1959,
so that the parties could address certain questions specified by the Court. 360 U.S. 924 (1959).
No argument was heard in November, however, because the Court had granted certiorari in
Noto V. United States, 361 U.S. 813 (1960), which raised questions related to Scales. The Court
put both cases over until February 23, 1960. On February 5, 1960, the Court granted certio
rari in Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board [SACB], 361
U.S. 951 (1960), that involved similar constitutional and statutory issues to those raised in
Scales and Noto. As a result, the Court rescheduled both cases to be heard on the same day as
SACB. 361 U.S. 952 (1960). Scales was argued before the Court for the final time on October
10, 1960. On June 5, 1961, the Court affirmed Scales's conviction. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
3 Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1988)).
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the government, and specific intent to accomplish that purpose as
soon as circumstances allow.^ The Scales decision is the only time the
Court directly sustained the criminal conviction of a citizen solely for
membership in a pohtical organization.'
Scales was sentenced to six years imprisonment, a longer term
than that given to many top-rankiiag Communist Party officials previ
ously convicted.® After Scales entered prison on October 2, 1961,
many prominent citizens mounted a campaign for clemency.' In a
recent interview, Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, former Deputy Attor
ney General, recalled that the campaign presented a pohtical problem
for the Kennedy Administration.® On the one hand, Scales's support
ers effectively criticized the administration for the disproportionate
penalty imposed on Scales. On the other hand, the administration
knew that some members of Congress who were strongly anti-commumst would condenm any decision to commute Scales's sentence.
Nevertheless, as Katzenbach recalls. Attorney General Robert Ken
nedy beheved that Scales's sentence was inequitable and recom
mended to the President that the commutation petition be granted.
On Christmas Eve, 1962, President Kennedy commuted Scales's sen
tence to time served and Scales was freed.®
This Introduction briefiy reviews state and federal efforts to
^ Scales's indictment charged him with these three elements. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 20506. The Court, in turn, upheld each one in the face of fifth amendment and first amendment
challenges. Id. at 224-30.
5 Other Communist Party members had been convicted under the Smith Act before Ju
nius Scales. In those cases, however, the members were indicted as organizers, advocates, and
inciters. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). Sunilarly, prior to Scales, the Court had considered the constitutionality of
state statutes containing membership provisions without ever ruling on the constitutionality of
those specific provisions. See, e.g., DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652 (1925). Since Scales, the Court has reaffirmed their interpretation of the Smith Act
membership clause. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmand, 401 U.S.
154, 165 (1971); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (companion case to Scales).
® Taylor, Forward to J. Scales & R. Nickson, Cause at Heart: A Former Communist
Remembers at xxiii (1987).
' A partial list of these individuals include: Roger Baldwin, Daniel Bell, Saul BeUow,
John C. Bennett, Van Wyck Brooks, Theodore Draper, Nathan Glazer, Robert F. Goheen,
Robert L. Heilbroner, Sidney Hook, Irving Howe, Martin Luther King, Jr., Reinhold
Niebuhr, Norman Podhoretz, A. Phillip Randolph, David Riesman, I. F. Stone, Mark Van
Doren, Edmund Wilson, and C. Vann Woodward. See A Petition to President John F. Ken
nedy For A Presidential Pardon for Junius Scales (J. Harlan's Collected Papers, Box 105,
Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.).
8 Telephone interview with Nicholas de B. Katzenbach by Sandra L. Cobden (Mar. 5,
1990).
9 For a description of Scales's prison experience and release, see J. Scales & R. Nickson,
Cause at Heart: A Former Communist Remembers 345-415 (1987).
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criminalize membership in subversive political organizations.'" It
also discloses for the fimt time Justice Potter Stewart's indecisiveness
over whether to vote to afiirm or to reverse Scales's conviction."
Although Stewart eventually provided the critical fifth vote to affirm
the conviction, he reached this result only after changing his mind at
least five times during a not quite two year period that the case was
pending before the Supreme Court.
Following this Introduction is an edited transcript of a video
taped discussion between Junius Scales and Telford Taylor, his attor
ney for the second jury trial and all three Supreme Court arguments.
The discussion is facilitated by Professor David Rudenstine and takes
place during his class on Free Speech and National Security. The
transcript offers portraits of the personalities that shaped this dra
matic and distinctive case, reveals the strategies employed during the
trials and arguments, and provides a brief look at the politics of the
time and its influence on the case.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL MEMBERSHIP

The history of the membership clause has its roots in several gov
ernment efforts to control subversive activity almost always at times
of substantial national stress. The earliest of these efforts transpired
in 1798 when war with France appeared imminent. Anxious to quiet
Republican opposition to and criticism of their political initiatives, the
FederaUst-controlled Congress enacted foiu: statutes, collectively re
ferred to as the Ahen and Sedition Laws.'^ While the first three stat
utes enacted were specifically directed at aliens, many of whom were
thought to support Republican poUcies, the foiu-th—the Sedition
Act—^targeted the general population, including citizens." In addi
tion to criminalizmg the writing or pubUcation of any false, scandal
ous, and malicious information about the government, the Sedition
Act went even farther and made it "unlawful [to] combine or conspire
together, with the intent to oppose any measure or measures of the
See infra text accompanying notes 12-46.
J' See infra text accompanying notes 47-76.
'2 The four statutes comprising the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798 were: (1) The Natu
ralization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (repealed 1802) (extended the period of residency required
for naturalization from 5 to 14 years); (2) The Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (expired 1800)
(permitted the President to deport any alien found to be a threat to the United States); (3) The
Enemy Alien Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1982)) (permitted the
President to deport, confine, or expel all "enemy" aliens during times of war or any threat of
war); (4) The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801) (criminalized seditious libel and
conspiracies to oppose the government). For a detailed history of the Alien and Sedition
Laws, including their enactment and enforcement, see J. Smith, Freedom's Fetters (1966).
12 See the first three statutes cited supra note 12.
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government of the United States.""* Although the act stopped short
of criminalizing mere membership, the Federalist administration was
able to use the act to eflfiectively repress its political opponents. From
its enactment in 1798 imtil its expiration in 1801, the act was em
ployed only against RepubUcan Party members, including at least
three political officeholders and four leading Republican papers."
The next major effort to control subversive activity came during
the Civil War. In addition to a series of measures designed to sup
press political opposition to the federal government," Congress en
acted the Conspiracies Act of 1861." Similar to the Sedition Act, the
Conspiracies Act also used the doctrine of conspiracy to criminalize
pohtical activity intended "to overthrow, or to put down, or to de
stroy by force" the federal government." As construed, the act sup
plemented the treason laws; it covered many of the activities not
included within the legal definition of treason" but were nonetheless
considered sufficiently threatening to the federal government to war
rant punishment.
The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74., § 1, 1 Stat. 596.
1' Authorities agree that the Sedition Act was used to secure at least 25 arrests, 15 indict
ments, and 10 convictions. All defendants were members of the Republican Party. For a brief
description of these cases, including the ones referred to in the text, see 1 N. Doisen, P. RwiH,.r
& B. Neubome, Emerson, Haber and Dorsen's Political and CSvil Rights in the United States
25-28 (4th ed. 1976); C. Rice, Freedom of Association 122-25 (1962); J. Smith, supra note 12,
at 176-87.
During the course of the war, several measures were employed to limit subversive activ
ity. Perhaps the most controversial was President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus. On April 27, 1861, Lincoln ordered the suspension of the writ from Washington to
Philadelphia. Memorandum from Pres. Abraham Lincoln to Gen. Winfield Scott (Apr. 27,
1861), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 347 (R. Easier ed. 1953) [hereinafter
Works]. The suspension was later extended to Bangor, Maine. Memorandum from Pres.
Abraham Lincoln to Gen. Winfield Scott (Oct. 14, 1961), in 4 Works 554. Lincoln's action
was completely condemned by Chief Justice Taney in Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 114
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). Nevertheless, Congress retroactively ratified both Lincoln's
authority to order the suspension and the suspension itself. Act of Mar. 3,1863, ch. 81, § 1,12
Stat. 755.
Another measure was the requirement of loyalty oaths. See, e.g.. Act of July 2, 1862, ch.
128, 12 Stat. 502; Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 64, 12 Stat. 326; H. Hyman, Era of the Oath (1954).
" Act of July 31, 1861, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 284.
>8 Id. At least one commentator has argued that the Conspiracies Act was a more power
ful weapon in the Executive arsenal than the Sedition Act because it did not require proof of an
overt act for conviction. See C. Rice, supra note 15, at 127. His claim, however, appears to be
based on little more than dicta in one circuit court case. Id. at 127 n.43 (citing to Charge to
Grand Jury—Treason and Piracy, 30 F. Cas. 1049 (CCD. Mass. 1861) (No. 18,277)). The
case Rice so heavily relies on did not refer to, much less compare, the Sedition Act to the
Conspiracies Act. See 30 F. Cas. at 1051.
" U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 3: "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in a^ering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."
20 See J. RandaU, Constitutional Problems Under T.innr»1n 78-79 (1963).
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Despite the successful enforcement of these earlier laws,^' states
by the early 1900s had begun to abandon conspiracy statutes as a
method of controlling subversive activity in favor of newly-enacted
statutes, often called Criminal Anarchy Laws or Criminal Syndical
ism Laws.^^ These statutes not only criminalized the teaching or ad
vocating of violent overthrow of the government,but many of them
also explicitly criminalized membership in organizations or associa
tions that espoused subversive doctrines. Although these membership
provisions were frequently challenged on federal constitutional
grounds, state courts regularly upheld them.^'* Until the Scales case,
however, the Supreme Court never directly ruled on a membership
provision in either a state or federal statute.^'
As states enacted criminal anarchy and syndicalism laws. Con
gress pursued its own path. In 1917, during the midst of World War
I, it enacted the Espionage Act,^® section three of which criminalized
during wartime the incitement of disloyalty and the obstruction of
enlistment, among other activities.^^ The next year Congress
amended the act to include other forms of prohibited speech such as
uttering contempt for the federal form of government and provoking
resistance to goverment measures.^® After the war. Congress sought
to convert these wartime statutes into peacetime tools. During the
1919-20 congressional term alone, approximately seventy peacetime
sedition bills were introduced. Nevertheless, none were enacted, due
to stiff opposition from a variety of quarters including prominent
21 For a discussion of the enforcement of the Sedition Act, see supra note IS. For a discus
sion of the enforcement of the Conspiracies Act and other civil war measures, see J. Rhodes, 4
A History of the United States 230 n.2 (1898).
22 One of the first such statutes enacted was The New York Criminal Anarchy Act, ch.
371,1902 N.Y. Laws 958 (codified at N.Y. Penal Law § 240.15 (McKinney 1989)). For a brief
discussion of the enactment of other criminal anarchy and syndicalism laws, see Z. Chafee, Jr.,
Free Speech in the United States 163-68 (1941); C. Rice, supra note 15, at 129-33.
23 For lists of the criminal anarchy and syndicalism laws enacted in each state, see Z.
Chafee, supra note 22, at 575-97 (Appendix III); Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism
Legislation in the United States, in 57 The John Hopkins Stud, in Hist, and Pol. Sci. 147-52
(Appendices I & II) (1939).
24 See, e.g.. People v. McClennegon, 195 Cal. 445, 452-53, 234 P. 91, 94 (1925); People v.
Taylor, 187 Cal. 378, 381-91, 203 P. 85, 86-90 (1921); People v. Wagner, 65 Cal. App. 704,
710, 225 P. 464, 467 (1923); State v. Dingman, 37 Idaho 253, 265-67, 219 P. 760, 765-66
(1923); State v. Berquist, 109 Kan. 382, 199 P. 101 (1921); People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich.
315, 354-57, 201 N.W. 358, 371 (1925); State v. Kassay, 126 Ohio St. 177, 184 N.E. 521
(1932); Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 145 A. 295 (1929). But see State v. Tonn,
195 Iowa 94, 115-16, 191 N.W. 530, 539 (1923) (in dicta, doubting the validity of the member
ship provision); People v. Lloyd, 304 111. 23, 45, 136 N.E. 505, 530 (1922) (same).
33 See discussion of cases supra note 5.
36 The Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, 40 Stat. 217 (repealed 1948).
37 Id. § 3 at 219.
38 Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921).
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members of the legal community, civil rights organizations, and the
press.^'
As the economic depression of the thirties continued and interna
tional tensions heightened, internal unrest and agitation increased,^
and congressional interest in internal subversion revived and intensi
fied. During the 1930s, for example, two House committees were
formed to investigate communist and other "un-American" activi
ties.^' Out of these committees came proposals to outlaw the Com
munist Party, the advocacy of dissent among the armed forces, and
the advocacy of violent overthrow of the government. Despite grow
ing support for these recommendations, they were vigorously opposed
and none were then enacted.^^ In 1939, however, circumstances
changed: Germany invaded Poland, the Soviets entered into a pact
with the Nazis, and the world began gearing itself for war. In the face
of these developments abroad, domestic opposition to politically re
pressive measures that had existed during the prior twenty years
faded.
II. THE SMITH ACT
As originally enacted, the Smith Act'^ was an omnibus measure,
encompassing various discrete eflForts to control subversive activity. It
consisted of three substantive titles and a fourth procedural title in
tended to preserve severability. Out of the three substantive titles,
only the fimt was directed at the general population. Its first section,
a revival of the House committee recommendation four years earlier,
prohibited the advocacy of disobedience, disloyalty, or mutiny among
the military. The second section, which contained the membership
clause, prohibited not only the advocacy for the violent overthrow of
the government, but also the organization of and membership in any
29 See Z. Chafee, Jr., supra note 22, at 169; see also M. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice
16 (1977) (describing the opposition movement); Z. Chafee, Jr., supra note 22, at 170-95 (argu
ing against the enactment of a peacetime sedition law).
30 See W. Foster, History of the Communist Party of the United States 276-395 (1952).
31 The first committee was formed in 1930. Chaired by Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr.
from New York, the committee focused specifically on the Communist Party. See Special
House Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States, Investigation of
Commtmist Propaganda, H.R. Rep. No. 2290, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931). The second com
mittee was formed in 1934. Chair^ by Representative John McCormack from Massachusetts,
it was broader in its focus than the Fish committee. In addition to investigating the Commu
nist Party, the McCormack committee focused on activities of the Nazi Party and other facist
organizations. See Special House Committe to Investigate Nazi and Other Propaganda, Inves
tigation of Nazi and Other Propaganda, H.R. Rep. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess (1934).
32 See M. Belknap, supra note 29, at 16-19; Legislation, 35 Colum. L. Rev 917 (1935).
33 Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1988)).
34 Id. tit. I, § 1 at 670.
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group promoting subversive doctrines.'® Finally, a third section per
mitted the seizure, pursuant to a search warrant, of any written
materials forbidden by the previous sections.'®
The second and third titles of the act were directed solely at
aliens. Title II added five additional classes to the categories of aliens
who could be denied entry into the United States or, if already here,
could be deported upon the warrant of the Attorney General." In
cluded within one of these new classes were any aliens who had been
members of a subversive organization at the time of entry into the
United States or any time thereafter." Title III authorized the regis
tration and fingerprinting of all aliens entering or then in the United
States."
In contrast to the efforts of the previous twenty years, the pas
sage of the Smith Act was relatively smooth as the dien provisions
^ave the act its political viability. Indeed, the focus of most of the
congressional debates was on the fairness of the alien provisions.'**'
The military disobedience prohibition that applied to all citizens was
rarely discussed.^' The membership clause was barely mentioned at
all.^' As one congressman cynically noted: "[Tjhe mood of this
House is such that if you brought in the Ten Commandments today
and asked for their repeal and attached to that request an alien law,
you could get it."^'
Nevertheless, the membership clause of the Smith Act was soon
examined in the courts. In 1943, the Eighth Circuit upheld the clause
35 Id. tit. I, § 2 at 671.
36 Id. tit. I, § 4 at 671.
3'' The five classes included: (1) aliens who knowingly and for pay assisted other aliens to
illegally enter the United States within five years of their own entry; (2) aliens who knowingly
and for pay assisted other aliens to illegally enter the United States on more than one occasion;
(3) aliens who had been convicted of possessing certain weapons (e.g., sawed-off shotguns); (4)
aliens who had been convicted of violating title I of this act within five years of their entry; (5)
aliens who had been convicted of violating title I of this act on more than one occasion. Id. tit.
II, § 20 at 671-72.
38 Section 20 made it illegal to become a member of a subversive organization. Id. tit. II,
§ 20 at 671-72. Section 23(b) rendered any alien who had either entered the United States as a
member of a subversive organization or at any time thereafter became one vunerable to depor
tation. Id. tit. II, § 23(b) at 673.
39 Id. tit. Ill at 673-76.
^ See, e.g., 86 Cong. Rec. 8342-47, 9031-35 (1940); 84 Cong. Rec. 9534-35, 9537-38,
10364-74, 10376-78 (1939).
41 See, e.g., 86 Cong. Rec. 8340, 8342 (1940); 84 Cong. Rec. 10374-76, 10379-80 (1939).
42 In two general descriptions of the bUl, the membership clause of title I was mentioned
once and omitted once. See 86 Cong. Rec. 9034 (1940) (omitting mention of the clause); id. at
8342 (mentioning clause). Membership in a subversive organization as a ground for deporta
tion was mentioned frequently. See, e.g., 86 Cong. Rec. 9032 (1940); 84 Cong. Rec. 9537,
9539, 10360-62 (1939).
43 84 Cong. Rec. 10370 (1939) (statement of Rep. Ford).
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against the challenge that it violated the first amendment by imposing
guilt on the basis of mere association.^ The court simply disagreed:
[G]uilt is entirely individual and personal.
. . . A s t o mere members, the statute expressly requires that
they be or become such "knowing the purposes thereof." What the
court and jury do is ascertain whether the organization has such
forbidden purposes and whether such requisite knowledge exists
and these must appear beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .^^
In 1952, the Fourth Circuit expanded on this theme. Knowing mem
bership in an unlawful organization, it claimed, rendered that organi
zation aid, support, and encouragement and, therefore, was within the
power of Congress to prohibit.^ The Supreme Court, however, did
not turn its attention to the membership clause until the Scales deci
sion in 1961.
III. THE AFFIRMANCE OF SCALES'S CONVICTIGN AND
STEWART'S FLIP-FLOPS
The Court's vote affirming Scales's conviction was 5 to 4, as nar
row a majority as could be had. If one Justice in the majority had
joined the four dissenters, Scales's conviction would have been re
versed. What has not been generally known until now is that Scales
came much closer to securing that essential fifth vote and a reversal
than either he, his attorneys, or anyone else not involved in the
Supreme Court proceedings had ever realized. During the twentytwo month period that the case was pending before the Court, Justice
Stewart wavered between voting to affirm and to reverse, changing his
mind no less than five times. In the end, he provided the critical fifth
vote and concurred in Justice Harlan's majority opinion, but that hap
pened only after Harlan agreed to significant changes proposed by
Stewart in a major portion of his opinion.
Stewart was a member of the Court when the Scales case was
argued for a second time on April 29, 1959.^' At the first conference
following reargument, Stewart informed his colleagues that he ex^ Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th CSr.), cert, denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943).
Id. at 143.
*6 Frankfeld v. United States, 198 F.2d 679, 683-84 (4th CSr. 1952), cert, denied, 344 U.S.
922 (1953).
President Eisenhower nominated Potter Stewart for the Supreme Court on January 17,
1959. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18,1959, at 40, col. 2. Stewart had been sitting on the Court for seven
months prior to his nomination under a recess appointment. The Senate confirmed his nomi
nation on May 5, 1959 and Stewart began his first term that same year. N.Y. Times, May 6,
1959, at 32, col. 3.
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pected to vote to reverse the conviction because the government's evi
dence pertinent to illegal advocacy did not satisfy the strict
evidentiary requirements the Court had defined in Yates v. United
States.^ If Stewart's inclination had held firm, the Court would have
likely reversed Scales's conviction at that point since that disposition
was already favored by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Douglas,
Black, and Brennan.^^
But Stewart must have wavered, for eight weeks later, just before
the Court recessed for the summer, the Court ordered that Scales be
reargued on November 10,1959, and specified five questions it wanted
the parties to address.In the fall, however, the Court granted certi
orari in Noto V. United States,and because it raised questions related
to those in Scales, the Court ordered that both cases 1^ heard on Feb
ruary 23, 1960.'^ Two weeks before the scheduled argximent, the
Court granted certiorari in Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Board [SACB]" which it said raised
questions related to Scales and Noto, and therefore ordered that argu
ment in all three cases be heard on October 10, 1960.'^
Four days before the October argument, Stewart told his col
leagues at a conference that he "had reserved his vote" in this case,
that he continued to be "concerned about the sufficiency of the evi
dence" under Yates, but that he was "inclined to affirm" the convic
tion.'' At the conference following the argument, however, Stewart
announced that he had changed his mind and was now inclined to
vote to reverse the conviction because the evidence in Scales on the
issue of party advocacy did not satisfy the Yates requirements.'®
Shortly thereafter Stewart likely changed his mind again and in
formed Harlan that he was willing to vote to affirm the conviction."
On that basis, Harlan drafted a majority opinion for the Covut af
firming Scales's conviction. This draft was circulated to the Justices
••8 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Judicial Conference Memorandum by J. Douglas, Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (Library of Congress, Box 1238).
J. Douglas, supra note 48.
50 360 U.S. 924 (1959).
51 361 U.S. 813 (1959).
52 361 U.S. 952 (1960).
53 361 U.S. 951 (1960).
^ 361 U.S. 952 (I960). For a complete history of the case see supra note 2.
55 Judicial Conference Memorandum by J. Douglas, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) (Library of Congress, Box 1238).
56 Id; Judicial Conference Memorandum by J. Brennan, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961) (available upon request at the Cardozo Law Review).
52 See Letter from J. Harlan to J. Stewart (Feb. 13, 1961) (J. Harlan's Collected Papers,
Box 105, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.) For the pertinent part of this
letter see infra text accompanying note 63.
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on December 14, I960.'®
In early February, 1961, Stewart responded to Harlan's draft
opinion by sending bim a copy of his own draft memorandum. In a
cover note, Stewart informed Harlan that he would not circulate it to
the other members of the Court until Harlan had "an opportumty ...
to look it over and give me the benefit of any further views you may
have."" Stewart's memorandum indicated that he agreed with all as
pects of Harlan's draft opinion except for the critical issue of whether
the govermnent's evidence in Scales satisfied the Yates requirement.*®
On this decisive issue, Stewart made unequivocal his disagreement
with Harlan:
[A]fter a thorough, independent search of both records, I simply
cannot agree that in the present case sufficient additional evidence
was adduced of the Party's activity and teaching to infuse it "with
permissible inferential vitahty, towards estabUshing 'advocacy of
action.' " Indeed, I think that, although the present case was tried
and submitted to the jury under the correct view of Smith Act ad
vocacy as illtuninated in the Yates opinion, the actual evidence
here was not significantly different from that contained in the Yates
record, and was therefore insufficient to support the jury's
verdict.**
Nevertheless, Stewart was self-conscious about his disagreement
with Harlan. This was only his second full term on the Court, he was
not a member of the Comt when Yates was decided, and Harlan, who
now proposed to author the majority opinion affirming Scales's con
viction, had himself written the Yates opinion.*^
Harlan must have sensed that Stewart was susceptible to being
persuaded to change his mind yet again because he quickly answered
Stewart. He reminded Stewart that he, Stewart, had told him shortly
after the October argument that he had "no difficulties with the Scales
record."*' Harlan also noted that he had revised four pages of the
draft opinion that discussed the proof in Scales in "an effort to meet
your troubles on that score."** He tried to reassure Stewart that
Yates's "definition of Smith Act advocacy and its requirement of
58 Id.; J. Harlan's Draft Opinion of United States v. Scales (Dec. 14, 1960) (J. Harlan's
Collected Papers, Box 104, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
59 Letter from J. Stewart to J. Harlan (Feb. 2, 1961) (J. Harlan's Collected Papers, Box
105, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
Id. at Addenda.
Id. at Addenda 2.
Id. at Addenda 1-2.
63 Letter from J. Harlan to J. Stewart (Feb. 13, 1961) (J. Harlan's Collected Papers, Box
105, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
64 Id.
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strict proof"®'—aspects of Yates that Harlan described to Stewart as
"healthy contribution[s] to this difficult field of law"®®—^were still
honored by the Court. To support this claim, he pointed to the "dif
ferent conclusion"®^ the Court was reaching in Noto.^ Harlan then
stated that although he was "not an enthusiast for these Smith Act
prosecutions,"®' and he believed the Court "should keep a tight rein
on them, ... [a] reversal here would be almost tantamount to over
ruling at least that part of Dennis and Yates which allowed the appli
cation of the statute to advocacy of unspecified future violence, and to
the recruitment and readying of a group to engage in violence at the
. . . direction of their leaders."^" Harlan closed his letter to his col
league by appealing to him for "a further chance to thrash this thing
out with you in face to face discussion, as your's is the deciding
vote."""
Two months passed before Stewart responded to Harlan in writ
ing. Finally, on April 13, 1961, Stewart wrote Harlan and confessed
the obvious, that the Scales case "has caused me more difficulties than
any other we have had since I have been here."'^ Although Stewart
remarked that he had "continuing doubts as to the sufficiency of the
evidence here under the standards estabUshed in Yates
he stated
that he had "concluded that I can conscientiously join in afiirming the
judgment."^'* In the remainder of the four page letter, Stewart offered
what he termed "minor suggested changes"" for Parts I, II, and IV of
Harlan's opinion and a rewrite of Part III which discussed the evi
dence of the Communist Party's advocacy of action and Scales's spe
cific intent to further the Party's purposes." Harlan incorporated
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Noto was a companion case to Scales in which the defendant was
convicted under the Smith Act of being a member of the Communist Party. In contrast to its
decision in Scales, the Court reversed Noto's conviction.
69 Letter from J. Harlan to J. Stewart (Feb. 13, 1961) (J. Harlan's Collected Papers, Box
105, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
70 Id. (referring to Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), and Yates v. United
States, 360 U.S. 920 (1959)).
71 Id.
72 Letter from J. Stewart to J. Harlan at 1 (Apr. 13, 1961) (J. Harlan's Collected Papers,
Box 105, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton Univ.)
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Referring to his rewrite of Part III, Stewart wrote Harlan: "Needless to say, I have no
pride of authorship. Indeed, in this instance, I have considerable lack of pride. My prime
purpose is to suggest that there be included references to additional evidence in the record
which seems to me essential to sustain this conviction." Id. at 4.
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Stewart's minor suggestions, accepted Stewart's version of Part III,
and thereby secured a majority to affirm Scales's conviction.

